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I. INTRODUCTION

The Panel invites us to contemplate what “complete justice” would
look like in the face of a disaster. Because justice has many dimensions,
the exercise is a difficult one. When one thinks of justice being done in
the aftermath of a catastrophe such as the Deepwater Horizon oil spill,
the natural focus is on compensatory justice. But compensatory justice
is itself complex. What it takes to achieve compensatory justice depends
in part on whether one thinks about compensation in terms of
distributive justice or responsibility-based justice. Moreover, schemes
of compensatory justice must also be assessed against criteria of
procedural justice. And standing apart from, but on par with,
compensatory justice are at least two other conceptions of justice: what
I will call justice as accountability and comparative justice.
In light of the many facets of justice, the ideal of “complete
justice”—i.e., the doing of justice along each of its dimensions—may be
unattainable. I don’t mean this to be a strongly skeptical conclusion.
Justice can and should be done. Instead, my point is that, in the wake of
a disaster, the doing of justice may require compromises among
competing metrics of justice.

∗ Professor, Harvard Law School. What follows is an edited version of comments given at the
panel of the AALS Section on Remedies at the AALS annual meeting in January, 2011. I am
grateful to the Section for inviting me to participate. By way of disclosure, I note that I served as a
consultant to the Gulf Coast Claims Facility and in that capacity prepared a report on liability for
economic loss under federal and state law. See John C.P. Goldberg, Liability for Economic Loss in
Connection with the Deepwater Horizon Spill, 30 MISS. COLL. L. REV. 335 app. (2011).
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II. COMPENSATORY JUSTICE
The core idea of compensatory justice is simple enough. Justice for
disaster victims means, among other things, that they should receive
compensation for their disaster-related losses. But lurking within this
idea are several questions: (1) to whom is compensation owed?; (2) how
much compensation is owed?; (3) from whom is compensation owing?;
(4) how much compensation is owing?
As to the first question, it seems unlikely that any conception of
compensatory justice requires compensation for everyone who suffers a
loss because of a disaster, no matter how remote or haphazard the
connection. Imagine (plausibly, in my view) a person who experiences
insomnia because he is haunted by constant exposure to “spillcam”
images of oil gushing from the Deepwater Horizon well.1 As a result, he
repeatedly nods off at work and is fired. As a matter of justice, is he
owed compensation? What about a yacht club that loses dues when, in
response to BP chief executive Tony Hayward’s public relations gaffes,2
BP executives are instructed by management not to renew their club
memberships?
One’s answer to the “to whom” question—and the other questions
noted above—will depend in part on whether one is addressing
compensatory justice as an issue of distributive justice or responsibilitybased justice.3 From the perspective of distributive justice, the questions
might be answered roughly as follows. Compensation is owed to
anyone who has suffered dislocation because of a disaster beyond some
baseline level of dislocation that people are expected to endure as part of
life’s ordinary vicissitudes. Compensation should be provided in
amounts sufficient to get victims back on their feet.4 (The notion of
“making whole” does not sit comfortably with distributive justice. I
suspect that few would suppose that disaster relief should fully
compensate victims for their pain and suffering.) Compensation is
1. See Hank Stuever, BP’s Oil Spillcam: A Horror Movie About the Gulf That’s Deeply
Compelling, WASHINGTON POST, May 26, 2010, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2010/05/25/AR2010052505047.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2012).
2. Liz Robbins, BP Chief Draws Outrage for Attending Yacht Race, N.Y. TIMES, June 19,
2010, at A20.
3. See John C. P. Goldberg, Comment, Misconduct, Misfortune and Just Compensation, 97
COLUM. L. REV. 2034, 2042-44 (1997) (contrasting disaster relief provided in the name of
distributive justice with compensation provided as corrective justice).
4. See id. at 2057-59; Robert L. Rabin, Continuing Tensions in the Resolution of Mass Toxic
Harm Cases: A Comment, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1037, 1041 (1995) (arguing that, in the face of
limited resources, when tragedy occurs, compensation should be limited to what is needed for
“survival and rehabilitation”).
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owing from all fellow citizens who can afford to make a contribution.5
(Some might even say that the obligation to contribute to relief efforts is
owing from all those in the world who are better off materially than the
victims.) Individuals’ contributions should be modest, with each
contributor paying a small amount to help spread the losses experienced
in a concentrated form by disaster victims.
Now, look at the question of compensatory justice from a
responsibility-based perspective. To whom is compensation owed? It is
owed to all those who can point to another person or entity and say,
roughly, “my misfortune is not just a misfortune, it is a victimization—it
is the result of your having breached a duty that you owed me.” Notice
that, depending on the source and scope of the alleged duty, the class of
persons to whom compensation is owed as a matter of responsibility
might be much narrower than the class that is owed compensation as a
matter of distributive justice. A person can be the victim of a disaster
without having to establish that she was wronged by another person. On
a responsibility-based conception of compensatory justice, how much
compensation is owed? American lawyers tend to think in terms of a
notion of restoration, of making whole.6 From whom is compensation
owing? Because the focus is on responsibility, there may be only one or
a few persons or entities with a justice-based obligation to compensate.
How much compensation is owing? This will depend on how many
parties are responsible for a given loss, and on principles of fair
allocation as among them.7
III. PROCEDURAL JUSTICE
Ordinarily, justice doesn’t just happen. Rather, justice must be
done. And there is justice in how justice gets done—procedural justice.
With respect to the doing of compensatory justice, procedural justice
requires that those with claims to compensation have a way of asserting
claims that is efficacious and not unduly burdensome.8 Moreover,
5. Goldberg, supra note 3, at 2044.
6. John C. P. Goldberg, Ten Half-Truths About Tort Law, 42 VAL. U. L. REV. 1221, 1269
n.110 (2008) (citing 4 FOWLER V. HARPER & FLEMING JAMES, JR. THE LAW OF TORTS § 25.1, at
494 (2d ed. 1986)).
7. For example, one might apportion liability among multiple responsible parties on a pro
rata basis, or on the basis of percentages corresponding to each party’s relative degree of fault or
culpability. In addition, one would have to consider how to allocate, as among victims and
responsible parties, the share of liability assigned to any responsible parties who are unreachable or
judgment-proof.
8. Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural Justice, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 181, 237 (2004) (discussing
different conceptions of procedural justice).
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because there are often uncertainties that will need to be resolved to
determine whether or what a claimant is owed, there must be an
adequate set of procedures for dealing with open questions. In short,
there is a need for procedures that allow claims to be finally and fairly
resolved, whether by authoritative order or by voluntary agreement.
Some scholars, perhaps most prominently Professor Linda
Mullenix, have expressed serious concerns about the compliance of
institutions such as the Gulf Coast Claims Facility (“GCCF”) with the
demands of procedural justice.9 I won’t take a stance on these issues.
Rather, I want to note how some distinctions I have mentioned already
are intertwined with them. In particular, it is important to emphasize
that the distinct conceptions of compensatory justice I mentioned
above—distributive and responsibility-based—may require different
procedures. The resolution of claims for disaster relief perhaps are best
achieved by a process that is cookie-cutter and fast, so those in need get
at least some relief quickly. The resolution of claims for responsibilitybased compensatory justice, precisely because they involve claims of
wrongdoing and responsibility, will require a more fulsome process to
ensure that the claimant really is a victim and that the person against
whom a claim is made really is a responsible party. It might even be the
case that procedural justice requires a two-track or hybrid procedural
system that is responsive to both the distributive and responsibilitybased aspects of compensatory justice. In other words, to achieve
procedural justice, we may need a system that allows victims prompt
access to emergency need-based payments so that (in conjunction with
litigation finance arrangements such as contingent fees) their efforts to
pursue responsibility-based claims for compensation are not undermined
by financial desperation.10
What counts as procedural justice will also depend in part on the
availability of options for claimants. It surely matters to any assessment
of the GCCF that it was set up to operate, and did operate, parallel to
court proceedings. Although claimants who accepted final payments
from the GCCF agreed not to pursue claims against BP and other
potentially liable parties, they were permitted simultaneously to assert

9. See generally Linda Mullenix, Prometheus Unbound: The Gulf Coast Claims Facility as
a Means for Resolving Mass Tort Claims—A Fund Too Far, 71 LA. L. REV. 819 (2011).
10. The GCCF’s two-track system of emergency and final payments was perhaps adopted in
part out of recognition of the need for a hybrid payment scheme of this sort.
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legal claims against BP and other defendants.11 Of course, there are
times when an apparent choice is merely notional, and it is possible that
certain classes of claimants, practically speaking, had no choice but to
accept what the GCCF was prepared to offer. However, now that a
tentative settlement of the consolidated litigation has been reached,12 it
seems that many victims really did have a choice, and this fact is highly
relevant to any assessment of whether the litigation system and the
GCCF operated in a manner consonant with the requirements of
procedural justice.
IV. JUSTICE AS ACCOUNTABILITY
When a disaster occurs, the attainment of justice may not only
require compensation but may also call for accountability. The doing of
justice, in other words, may include calling to account those responsible
for a disaster.
Accountability is a relational concept: one person or entity is held
accountable to another.13 As such, it can take different forms. Criminal
prosecutions and regulatory proceedings are ways of holding a person or
entity accountable to the public. To the extent BP faces criminal fines,
for example, it is being punished on behalf of the citizens of the United
States for its violation of certain prohibitions against causing
environmental degradation.14
Civil proceedings can be about accountability of a different sort—
accountability to particular victims. When accountability takes this
form, it blends together with notions of compensatory justice and
procedural justice, even though it is distinct from both of them. A civil
lawsuit can be a way of holding a wrongdoer accountable to a victim and
a way of seeing to it that compensatory justice is done. But the two
ideas often come apart. Indeed, just to be annoying, I would suggest that
whether they come apart will depend in part on issues of procedural
justice. It is conceivable, for example, that our procedures for enabling

11. GULF COAST CLAIMS FACILITY FINAL RULES GOVERNING PAYMENT OPTIONS,
ELIGIBILITY AND SUBSTANTIATION CRITERIA, AND FINAL PAYMENT METHODOLOGY (Feb. 18,
2010), http://www.gulfcoastclaimsfacility.com/FINAL_RULES.pdf.
12. Daniel Fisher, BP Settles With Plaintiff Lawyers, Pegs Cost at $7.8 Billion, FORBES, Mar.
3, 2012.
13. Colin Scott, Accountability in the Regulatory State, 27 J.L. & SOC’Y 38, 40 (2000)
(accountability is a relational concept that imposes a “duty to give account for one’s actions to some
other person or body”).
14. See David M. Uhlmann, After the Spill is Gone: The Gulf of Mexico, Environmental
Crime, and the Criminal Law, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1413 (2011).
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victims of a disaster to pursue claims against responsible parties will
allow for a responsibility-based notion of compensatory justice to be
done, yet not give victims a basis for feeling satisfied that the person or
entity paying the compensation has been held accountable to them.
Indeed, this is a familiar feature of, and complaint about, ordinary civil
litigation that results in quick settlements where there is little process, no
admission of fault, and the like. In such cases, claimants are sometimes
left feeling that the process has failed them precisely by denying them an
opportunity to have defendants held accountable to them.
Notice also that accountability can take different forms and can be
addressed to different actors with different sorts of connections to a
disaster. When it comes to accountability for a catastrophic oil spill, we
will naturally and correctly focus on an entity such as BP. But we might
also suppose that, in justice, there should be some form of governmental
accountability.15 This might be true, for example, if there is evidence of
lax regulation or an inadequate response to a disaster. In principle,
justice as accountability might even call for the imposition of liability on
governments for some portion of victims’ losses. It might also, or in the
alternative, call for political accountability at the ballot box.
One might even suppose that there must be accountability for
persons who were only indirectly involved in the disaster. It might be
argued, for example, that every competent adult American is weakly
complicit in the Deepwater Horizon spill by virtue of our intemperate
energy consumption habits and, on this basis, should be held accountable
for it. Of course, it does not follow that each of us should be criminally
punished or held liable to victims of the spill. Instead, justice might
require a different form of accountability. It might require us actively to
support policies designed to curb our consumption of fossil fuels, or that
promote the restoration of natural resources in afflicted areas.16
IV. COMPARATIVE JUSTICE
One of the most interesting and difficult aspects of justice has to do
with how to frame our inquiries into justice. As Ken Feinberg has often
noted, to think about justice in connection the Deepwater Horizon Spill
invites comparisons with the treatment of those injured in the 9/11

15. See Goldberg, supra note 3, at 2041, 2043-46.
16. Cf. Iris Marion Young, Responsibility and Global Labor Justice, 12 J. POL. PHIL. 365,
377-80 (2004) (outlining a notion of “political responsibility” by which persons who participate in
systems that perpetuate certain structural injustices have reason to take steps to ameliorate those
injustices).
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attacks, those injured by Hurricane Katrina, and those injured in the
Oklahoma City bombing.17 Suppose we conclude that the 9/11 Fund did
right by eligible claimants as a matter of compensatory and procedural
justice. Did it thereby do wrong as to the victims of the Oklahoma City
bombing? Does the creation of the GCCF, given the very different sort
of response to Katrina, create an injustice as to the victims of Katrina?
Some of the most difficult issues of justice raised by disasters are in the
end questions about the consistency with which we respond to them.
Insofar as this sort of inconsistency is itself an injustice, it may call for
more uniform protocols of response. To be sure, some such protocols
are already in place (though whether they are adequate is a different
question). They include the provision of disaster relief through agencies
such as Federal Emergency Management Agency (“FEMA”),18 and the
availability, in principle, of the tort system to all person with colorable
claims against allegedly responsible wrongdoers.
It is at least
conceivable, however, that comparative justice requires the
establishment of a set of national compensation protocols for disaster
victims.

17. 1 KENNETH R. FEINBERG ET AL., DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FINAL REPORT OF THE SPECIAL
MASTER FOR THE SEPTEMBER 11TH VICTIM COMPENSATION FUND OF 2001, at 78 (2004).
18. See 42 U.S.C. § 5121-5207 (1988).
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